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Abstract: This research work titled, “Virtue epistemology: Internalism and Externalism 
Justification” attempts to give a succinct analysis of the justification of our knowledge. It 
rigorously scrutinizes the sources of our knowledge claim. Whether the justificatory criteria to 
authenticate our knowledge claim are external or internal. It is discovered that the internalism-
externalism (I-E) debate lies near the centre of contemporary discussion about epistemology. 
The basic idea of internalism is that justification is solely determined by factors that are 
internal to a person. Externalists deny this, asserting that justification depends on additional 
factors that are external to a person. A significant aspect of the I-E debate involves setting out 
exactly what counts as internal to a person. One of the arguments for externalism is that if a 
process counts as cognitive when it is performed in the head, it should also count as cognitive 
when it is performed in the world. We sometimes perform actions in our heads that we usually 
perform in the world, so that the world leaks into the mind. Internalism has epistemological 
implications: if a process gives us an empirical discovery when it is performed in the world, it 
will also give us an empirical discovery when it is performed in the head. I explore the 
relation between internalism and externalism and contend that both are crucial and needed for 
the purpose of justification.  The work employed analytical, expository and critical methods. 
 





Internalism and externalism are like rivulet coming from the same river. The river is 
reliabilism. To further determine whether the fulcrum of our justification is external or 
internal has led us to internalism and externalism which have now constituted themselves as 
independent schools of thought with different adherents (Ozumba, 169). Laurence Bonjour 
corroborated this point when he said that, “one of the major disputes in epistemology in the 
last three decades or so has been that between internalists and externalists theories of 
justification and knowledge”.Internalism in the first instance is a thesis about the basis of 
either knowledge or justified belief. This first form of internalism holds that a person either 
can have a form of access to the basis for knowledge or justified belief. The key idea is that 
the person either is or can be aware of this basis. Externalists, by contrast, deny that one 
always can have this sort of access to the basis for one’s knowledge and justified true belief. A 
second form of internalism, is connected to justified true belief but probably extended to 
knowledge as well, concerns not access but rather what the basis for a justified belief really is. 




Mentalism is the thesis that what ultimately justifies any belief is some mental state of the 
epistemic agent holding that belief. Externalism on this dimension, then, would be the view 
that things other than mental states operate as justifiers. A third form of internalism concerns 
the very concept of justification, rather than access to or the nature of justifiers. This third 
form of internalism is the deontological concept of justification, whose main idea is that the 
concept of epistemic justification is to be analyzed in terms of fulfilling one’s intellectual 
duties or responsibilities. Externalism with respect to the concept of epistemic justification 
would be the thesis that this concept is to be analyzed in terms other than special duties or 
responsibilities. 
Across different areas of philosophy, “internalism” and “externalism” designate 
distinctly opposed positions. In the philosophy of mind, the debate between internalists and 
externalists arose in the 1970s with a focus on meaning and mental representation and the 
nature of mental states. Internalists or individualists hold that the nature of an individual’s 
mental state depends metaphysically just on facts about that individual, facts intrinsic to that 
individual, rather than her social or physical environment. A common way to express 
internalism is to say that an individual’s mental states are fixed or determined by the intrinsic, 
physical properties of that individual (Robert A. Wilson, 1). 
 
Virtue Epistemology 
 Virtue epistemology is a collection of recent approaches to epistemology that give 
epistemic concepts an important and fundamental role. 
 Virtue epistemology is traced to Ernest Sosa, an American Philosopher, who was 
attempting to solve the controversy between foundationalism and coherentism, over the 
structure of epistemic justification. Virtue epistemology is one which holds that the problem 
of guaranteeing valid knowledge can be solved by reference to the possession and application 
of virtue (172). 
 Ernest Sosa maintained that there are basically two forms of virtue epistemology: The 
first has correlate with Aristotle’s moral virtues. Epistemology builds its account of epistemic 
normality on the subject’s responsible manifestation of epistemic character. The other form of 
virtue epistemology cleaves closer to Aristotelian intellectual virtues while recognizing a 
broader set of competences restricted to basic faculties of perception, introspection and like 
(320). 
 
TYPES OF VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
Virtue Reliabilism; 
 This group of virtue epistemology try to explain knowledge or justification in terms of 
the truth conduciveness of the process by which an agent forms a true belief. The basic idea is 
that one knows that p only if one’s belief that is formed from an epistemic virtue that reliably 
produces true belief (323). 
 Virtue reliabilist situates knowledge and justification entirely on the agents’ 
reliableness. For them, a reliable person will produce reliable knowledge. Knowledge for them 
centres on the means through which it is gotten. 
 The virtue reliabilists maintained that reliability is the basic quality one must possess 
to help him analyze truth over error. 
 Sosa contend that one has a reliable virtuous knowledge or faculty relative to an 




environment “E” if and only if one has an inner nature “I” in virtue of which one would 
mostly attain the truth and avoid error in a certain field of proposition “F” when in certain 
condition “C”. He identifies reason, perception, introspection and memory as the qualities that 
most obviously satisfy these conditions. 
 
Virtue Responsibilism: 
 This theory contrast with virtue reliabilism in at least two important ways. First, virtue 
responsibilists think of intellectual virtues not as cognitive faculties like introspection and 
memory but rather as traits of character and attentiveness, courage, carefulness and 
thoroughness. Second, while virtue reliabilists tend tofocus on the task of providing a virtue-
based account of knowledge and justification the virtue responsibilists pursued different 
epistemological project that holds that epistemologists should pay attention to personal, active 
and social dimensions of the cognitive life. 
 The central focus of virtue responsibilism is that an epistemologically responsible 
person is capable of leading others to attain certainty in knowledge. 
 Other virtues that a responsibilist need according to Lorraine Code are: open-
mindedness, intellectual openness, honesty and integrity. 
According to Sosa, virtue relates to cognitive capacity through which somebody uses 
his reliable knowledge to justify a belief and/or claim to knowledge and such capacity must be 
conducive to truth achievement (172). 
 Ozumba argues that for Sosa, virtue need not be viewed purely from moral 
perspective. What is important are: intellectual virtues that provokes cognitive abilities and 
cognitive powers such as perception and reason. 
 Virtue epistemology can be summarize as, the better the intellectual virtue a person 
has, the better it is for the person to access and discriminate options that call for truth 
determination in his given field of expertise. The expertise will not base his verdict of truth 
purely on coherentism or foundationalism. Beliefs may cohere and may not be true vice versa. 
The externalist will want to relativize the reliableness to environment while the internalist may 
want to relativize the reliableness to consciousness. 
 
INTERNALISM 
 The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification allows us to bring into 
focus different notions of internalstates. Internalism is best understood as the thesis that 
propositional justification, not doxastic justification, is completely determined by one’s 
internal states. But what are one’s internal states? One’s internal states could be one’s bodily 
states, one’s brain states, one’s mental states (if these are different than brain states), or one’s 
reflectively accessible states. The two most common ways of understandinginternalism has 
been to take internal statesas either reflectively accessible states or mental states. The former 
view is known as accessibilism and it has been championed by Roderick Chisholm and 
Laurence Bonjour. The latter view is known as mentalism and it has been defended by 
Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. 
 On an accessibilist view, every factor that determines whether one’s belief is 
propositionally justified is reflectively accessible. Since the causal origins of one’s beliefs are 
not in general reflectively accessible they do not determine whether one’s belief is 
propositionally justified. But whether or not one’s belief that p and one’s belief that q are 




contradictory is reflectively accessible. Since contradictory beliefs cannot both be justified, 
one can ascertain by reflection alone whether pairs of beliefs lack this devastating epistemic 
property. 
 One should note that the above claim that the causal origins of one’s beliefs are not, in 
general, reflectively accessible is an anti-Cartesian claim. Arguably, Descartes thought that 
one could always discover the causal origins of one’s beliefs. On the Cartesian view, causal 
relations that hold between beliefs and experiences and beliefs are reflectively accessible. 
Many scholars, however, believe this view is false. Stemming from Freud’s work many now 
think that one does not have the kind of access Descartes though one had to the causal origins 
of one’s beliefs. Given this an accessibilist view about doxastic justification – that is, 
propositional justification + the causal origins of one’s belief – is not feasible. Accessibilists 
should only require that every factor that determines whether one’s belief is propositionally 
justified is reflectively accessible. 
 There are varieties of accessibilist views depending on how one unpacks what states 
count as reflectively accessible. Are these states that one is able to reflectively access now or 
states that one may access given some time? If accessiblism is not restricted to current mental 
states then it needs to explain where the cut off is between states that count towards 
determining justificatory status and those that don’t count. Richard Feldman has a helpful 
article on this topic in which he defends the strong thesis that it is only one’s current mental 
states that determine justificatory status (Feldman, 143-156). 
 The other prominent view of internal states is that they are mental states. This view is 
known as mentalism. Mentalism, like is a view about propositional justification, not doxastic 
justification. One’s mental state completely determines the justificatory status of one’s beliefs. 
 
EXTERNALISM 
 Externalism is the epistemic theory that holds that the justification of every 
knowledge claims lies at the external realm of the justifiers. Put differently the externalist 
contends that certitude in knowledge can be attained through an in-depth study of state of 
affairs. For them certitude in knowledge lies in the objects of knowledge not in the individual 
investigating the object. These two opposing theses focus on justified belief rather than 
knowledge, though there are close parallels. Suppose the testimony you receive from another 
person produces in you the justified belief that there are geese in the park. We may also 
suppose that this justified belief falls short of knowledge. We can say that a justifier for this 
belief is the testimony one has received from the other person. Here a justifier is an analog of 
what was termed above a knowledge basis and, as in the latter case, we will allow that 
justifiers can be beliefs, or experiences, or facts about the production of the belief. 
Philosophers take different stances on what legitimate justifiers may be, so that it is difficult to 
come up with an account of justifiers that is neutral between competing theories of epistemic 
justification. It will not do to say that everything relevant to a person’s justified belief at some 
time counts as a justifier for that belief. For that would count possession of the concepts that 
are necessary for one to understand a belief that p as among the justifiers for that belief, and 
clearly that would be a mistake. Instead, we can say this: The justifiers for a given justified 
belief are those items that make up or constitute the person’s justification for that belief at that 
time. They are those items, whether experiences, states of affairs, or other beliefs, on which 
the person’s current justification is based. 




Virtue Epistemology and Internalism/Externalism (I-E) Distinction 
 The simple conception of the I-E debate as a dispute over whether the facts that 
determine justification are all internal to a person is complicated by several factors. First, 
some epistemologists understand externalism as a view that knowledge does not require 
justification while others think it should be understood as an externalist view of justification. 
Second, there is an important distinction between having good reasons for one’s belief (that is 
propositional justification) and basing one’s belief on the good reasons one possesses (that is, 
doxastic justification). This distinction matters to the nature of the internalist thesis and 
consequently the I-E debate itself. Third, there are two different and prominent ways of 
understanding what is internal to a person. This bears on the nature of the internalist thesis and 
externalist arguments against internalism. 
Arguments for Internalism 
 This section examines prominent arguments for internalism. I will discuss two 
motivations for internalism: the appeal to the Socratic/Cartesian project; the appeal to 
deontology. These two motivations are conspicuous in arguments for internalism. After giving 
each reason I shall consider externalist reaction. 
• Socratic/Cartesian Arguments  
 The common strategy internalists employ is to emphasize that epistemic justification 
requires having good reasons for one’s beliefs. As both Socrates and Descartes stressed, it is 
not rational to believe p without possessing a good reason for believing p. Suppose I believe 
that the Telecom’s stock will drastically fall tomorrow, it’s reasonable to ask why I think 
that’s true. Clearly it’s wrong to repeat myself, saying “I believe that true because it is true.” 
So it seems I must have a reason, distinct from my original belief, for thinking that Telecom’s 
stock will fall. Also I cannot appeal to the causal origins of that belief or to the reliability of 
the specific belief process. Those sorts of facts are beyond my ken. Whatever I can appeal to 
will be something I am aware of. Moreover, I can’t merely appeal to another belief, for 
example, Karen told me that Telecom’s stock will fall. I need a good reason for thinking that 
Karen is good indicator about these sorts of things. Apart from that supporting belief, it’s not 
rational to believe that Telecom’s stock will fall. So rationality requires good reasons that 
indicate a belief is true. The appeal to the Socratic/Cartesian project is a way to motivate the 
claim that it is a basic fact that rationality requires good reasons. 
 This requirement conflicts with externalism since externalism allows for the 
possibility that one’s belief is justified even though one has no reasons for that belief. To draw 
out this commitment let us expand on the above example. Suppose that my belief that 
Telecom’s stock will fall is based on my beliefs that Karen told me so and that Karen is a 
reliable indicator of these things. But not every belief of mine is supported by other beliefs I 
have. These kinds of beliefs are called basic beliefs, beliefs that are not supported by other 
beliefs. Consider your belief that there’s a cube on the table. What reason do you have for this 
belief? It might be difficult to say. Yet internalism requires that you have some reason 
(typically, the content of one’s experience) that supports this belief if that belief is rational. 
Externalists think that that is just too tall of an order. In fact, one of the early motivations for 
externalism was to handle the justification of basic beliefs (Armstrong, 45). In general, 
externalists think that basic beliefs can be justified merely by the belief meeting some external 
condition. One complication with this, though, is that some externalists think a basic belief 
require reasons but that reasons should be understood in an externalist fashion (Alston, 179). 





 The argument from the deontological character of justification to internalism proceeds 
as follows. Justification is a matter of fulfilling one’s intellectual duties but whether or not one 
has fulfilled one’s intellectual duties is entirely an internal matter. One fulfils one’s 
intellectual duties when one has properly taken into account the evidence one possesses. If 
Smith scrupulously analyzes all the relevant information about Telecom’s stock prices and 
draws the conclusion that Telecom’s prices will soar, then Smith’s belief is justified. If it later 
comes to light that the information was misleading, this doesn’t impugn our judgment about 
Smith’s belief at that time. Smith was intellectually virtuous in his believing and drew the 
appropriate conclusion given the evidence he possessed. In contrast, if Jones is an 
epistemically reckless stock broker who does not study the market before he makes his 
judgments, but happens to hit on the true belief that Telecom’s stock prices will fall, then we 
do not count his belief as justified since he ignored all the relevant evidence. Jones should 
have believed otherwise. 
 The cases of Smith and Jones support the claim that fulfilling one’s intellectual duty is 
entirely a matter of what one is able to determine by reflection alone. Both Smith and Jones 
are able to determine that their evidence indicates Telecom’s stock will soar. Smith 
appropriately believes this and Jones does not. Since externalists would require some other 
non-reflectively accessible condition, externalism is wrong. One should note that this 
argument supports accessibilism, not mentalism. 
 
EXTERNALIST REACTION 
 Externalists have responded to this line of argument in two ways. First, some 
externalists deny that facts about duties, rights, or blameworthiness are relevant to the sense of 
justification necessary for knowledge. Second, other externalists deny that the deontological 
character of justification supports accessibilism. Arguments of the first kind fall into two 
groups: (a) arguments that a necessary condition for rights, duties, or blameworthiness is not 
met with respect to belief and (b) arguments that facts about deontology are not relevant to 
determining epistemic facts. The most common argument for (a) is that beliefs are outside of 
an individual’s control, and so it does not make sense to consider an individual blameworthy 
for a belief. This is the issue of doxastic voluntarism. 
 
Arguments for Externalism 
 The following is an examination of two of three prominent reasons for externalism – 
the argument from the truth connection, the argument from ordinary knowledge ascriptions, 
and the argument from the implausibility of radical skepticism. Also included are the main 
internalist responses. 
• Truth Theory 
 A very powerful argument for externalism is that epistemic justification is essentially 
connected to truth. Epistemic justification differs from prudential or moral justification. One 
can be prudentially justified in believing that one’s close friend is a good chap. One is 
prudentially justified in believing that this is true. But it’s possible that one has good epistemic 
reasons for withholding this belief. So one is not epistemically justified in believing one’s 
close friend is a good fellow. How should we account for this difference between prudential 
and epistemic justification? The natural response is to hold that epistemic justification implies 




that one’s belief is objectively likely to be true whereas prudential justification (or other non-
epistemic forms of justification) does not. However, whether one’s belief is objectively likely 
to be true is not determined by one’s mental states or one’s reflectively accessible states. The 
objective likelihood of a belief given a body of evidence is a matter of the strength of 
correlation in the actual world between the truth of the belief and the body of evidence. If one 
applies some liquid to a litmus paper and it turns red, then the objective likelihood that the 
liquid is acidic is very high. But the strong correlation between red litmus paper and acidity is 
not reflectively accessible. But the strong correlation between red litmus paper and acidity is 
not reflectively accessible. So, if epistemic justification implies that one’s belief is objectively 
likely to be true then justification is not determined entirely by one’s internal states. 
• Skepticism 
 Another main motivation for externalism is its alleged virtues for handling skepticism 
in at least some of its varieties. One powerful skeptical argument begins with the premise that 
we lack direct access to facts about the external world. For any experiential justification we 
have for believing some fact about the external world – for example, there’s a magnolia tree – 
it’s possible to have that same justification even though there’s no such fact. The experience 
one has is caused by a state of one’s brain and it is possible that science could develop a 
method to induce in one that brain state even though there are no magnolia trees for hundreds 
of miles. The skeptic continues to argue that since we lack direct access to facts about the 
external world we lack non-inferential knowledge (or justification) for believing those facts. 
The final step of the skeptic’s argument is that we do lack sufficient evidence for inferential 
knowledge (or inferential justification) for believing those facts. Here the skeptic argues that 
the evidence we possess for external world beliefs does not adequately favour commonsense 
over a skeptical thesis. Any appeal to experiential evidence will not decide the case against the 
skeptic and the skeptic is happy to enter the fray over whether commonsense beats skepticism 
with regard to the theoretical virtues, for example, coherence and simplicity. Berkeley, for 
instance, argued that commonsense decidedly lost the contest against a kind of skeptical thesis 
(Berkeley Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous 9). 
 Internalists find this kind of argument very difficult to rebut. Internalists tend to focus 
on the final step and argue that even though experience does not imply that skepticism is false, 
it nevertheless makes skepticism much less probable than commonsense. This response is 
intuitive but it brings with it a number of controversial commitments. The ensuing debate is 
too complex to summarize here. The upshot though is that it is no easy task to maintain this 
intuitive response. Consequently, externalists think they have a distinct advantage over 
internalism. Externalists tend to think internalism lands in skepticism but that we have good 
reason to suspect skepticism is false. Externalists eagerly point out that their view can handle 
the skeptical challenge. 
 Externalists typically address the skeptic’s argument by denying that lack of direct 
access with a fact implies lack of non-inferential knowledge or justification. In terms of an 
early version of externalism. Armstrong’s causal theory (Armstrog, 1973) – if one’s 
perceptual belief that p is caused by the fact that makes it true then one knows that p but the 
core idea is that a lack of direct access doesn’t preclude non-inferential knowledge. 
 
INTERNALIST REACTION 
 Internalists argue that the problem of the truth connection is a problem for everyone. 




Epistemic justification is essentially connected to the truth in a way that distinguished it from 
prudential justification. But it is exceedingly difficult to note exactly what this connection 
consists of. Internalists stress that the proposed externalist solution that epistemic justification 
raises a belief’s objective likelihood of truth isn’t as straightforward as it first appear. The 
intuition in the new evil demon problem illustrates that epistemic justification does not imply 
that one’s belief is objectively likely to be true. So to generate an argument against internalism 
from the truth connection, one needs to do more than appeal to the intuition of a strong 
connection between justification and truth. The problem of the truth connection for 
internalism is an active area of research. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  This work noted that the relation between internalism and externalism in relation to 
virtue epistemology depends on what we take internalism or externalism to be. Both theories 
are relevant for the purpose of certainty in knowledge. Externalism, maintained that we 
perform cognitive operations in the external world and use the external world as an 
information store while internalism maintained that we perform operations in our minds that 
we would normally perform in the world. Thus, the lingering debate between the internalists 
and externalists as regards epistemic justification can only yield fruitful epistemic results 
through the rigorous process of harmonizing, synthesizing and harnessing their conflicting 
views into a coherent whole through the method of integrative. 
 Virtue reliabilists and virtue responsibilists alike have claimed to have the more 
accurate view of knowledge and justification by arguing that a virtue-based epistemology is a 
sure means to acquiring certainty in knowledge. 
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